Learning and innovation in developing economy clusters: Comparing private and non-profit intermediaries in cluster governance by Clarke, Ian et al.
1 
 
Paper presented at SPRU 50
th
 anniversary conference 
University of Sussex 7-9th Sept 2016  
 
Learning and innovation in Developing Economy Clusters: Comparing Private and 
Non-Profit Intermediaries in Cluster Governance 
 
Dr Ian Clarke: Senior Lecturer at the University of Greenwich 
Dr Laurens Klerkx: Associate Professor at the University of Wageningen 
Dr Matias Ramirez: Senior Lecturer at SPRU, University of Sussex 
 
Abstact 
In this paper we ask what role governance of intermediary organisations plays for enhancing 
the upgrading of producers in emerging agricultural clusters. This is an important question 
because the argument is increasingly made that broad multiparty governance can be effective 
at creating both vertical and horizontal ties and restructuring network relations. We argue that 
organisational governance matters, but that rather than just focussing on the agency of single 
organisations, intermediary activities will emerge from the interaction and negotiation 
between expectations of other actors, the degree of embeddedness of the intermediary in the 
cluster and the actions of other intermediaries undertaking overlapping roles. Two case 
studies of emerging clusters in developing country settings are discussed– the mango cluster 
in Piura, northern Peru and a cluster of palm oil producers in central Colombia, that include 
organisations with different governance structures.  
 
Keywords 
Intermediary, Cluster, Development, Agriculture  
 
Introduction 
The important role intermediary organisations play in strengthening connections between 
local producers and between local producers and global value chains in emerging economies 
has been recognized by an extensive literature (Bell and Giuliani, 2007; Caniels and Romijn, 
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2003; Clarke and Ramirez, 2014; Felzensztein, 2008; Kilelu et al., 2013; Mmari, 2015; 
Poulton et al., 2010; Shou and Intarakumnerd, 2013; Szogs, 2008; Szogs et al., 2011; Visser 
and Atzema, 2008; Watkins et al., 2015). These intermediaries can take different vertical 
(between different value chain actors) and horizontal coordination roles (between producers), 
and hence are important in forging contractual arrangements. Intermediaries are also argued 
to help technological upgrading of producers by improving the supply of services (Poulton et 
al., 2010), in order to boost cluster performance and enhance compliance with quality 
standards in global value chains (Iizuka, 2009; Klerkx et al., 2012; Perez-Aleman, 2010).  
However, there are also strong arguments which suggest that understanding the 
relationship between intermediaries and economic upgrading in developing economy 
contexts has become complex in part because, as Moss (2009) has argued, the breadth of the 
economic activities that can benefit from upgrading has opened up new spaces for 
intermediation and many organisations with varied incentives are drawn in. Diverse 
intermediaries have different objectives, stakes and interests, different internal governance 
modes and different positioning in networks. Moreover, some intermediaries position 
themselves as ‘neutral’ and ‘honest’ and claim to provide facilitating roles by bringing 
together stakeholders and promoting collective action (Hellin, 2012; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2009),  while others have a key normative interest in achieving policy goals and business 
goals and actively lobby for and translate interests of those they represent (Goldberger, 2008; 
Hargreaves et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014), or may aim to gain control over the relationships 
they mediate (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Obstfeld, 2005). This is often connected to their 
governance set-up, i.e. whether they are government organizations, NGOs, or sector 
representatives with related governance modes (e.g. hierarchy, collective decision making). 
In networks and clusters often different intermediaries are active (Kilelu et al., 2013; Parag 
and Janda, 2014; Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008), and their activities may be complementary or 
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conflicting, and may serve the same audiences but for different purposes and with different 
motives. The above suggests the need to open up a debate on the influence of different 
intermediaries and how organisational governance relates to other features of agglomerations 
in clusters.  
We tackle this question in the context of the influence of intermediaries in enhancing 
the upgrading of different producers in emerging agricultural clusters By organisational 
governance we refer to the rules, principles and traits that define how decisions (and the 
motivations for taking decisions) are made in organisations (McDermott et al 2009). 
However, we also follow Moss (2009), who defines governance as the collective pursuit of 
public, common or individual interests and that a defining asset of intermediaries is their 
ability to reap collective benefits. Organisational governance is therefore in part determined 
the purpose for which the organisation was originally established and the ownership structure. 
Hence for example public sector organisations are usually established to provide public goods 
or services.  
However, organisations are not static, their roles can evolve and new functions 
layered on. For example, the argument has been increasingly made that governance rules and 
principles can be “latched or layered” on to intermediaries (McDermott et al 2009) and in 
particular that intermediaries with a public-private governance (PPG) can have “multiparty” 
governance by combining a private sector drive to establish cross-cutting ties with different 
organisations outside the cluster whilst at the same time the public sector ethos can ensure 
there is participatory governance, facilitating inclusion of small producers in the adoption of 
new organisational and technological innovations (Safford 2007, Zuckerman and Sgourev 
2006). We argue that this process of “malleable” governance can occur not just with PPG 
organisations, but with a range of other intermediary organisations, producing important 
outcomes for clusters.   
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We therefore reflect that whilst much research has been undertaken on roles and 
functions of intermediary organizations (Gassmann et al., 2011; Hakkarainen and Hyssalo, 
2016; Howells, 2006; Katzy et al., 2013; Smedlund, 2006; Van Lente et al., 2003), far less 
research has been undertaken on how the organisational identity and structural positioning of 
intermediaries in clusters can be a key driver for (strategic) behaviour of intermediaries 
(Goldberger, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009).  
Two case studies of emerging clusters in developing country settings are presented– 
the mango cluster in Piura, northern Peru and a cluster of Palm oil producers in central 
Colombia. In both clusters, small producers play a significant role and intermediary 
organisations are critical in articulating these networks for the provision of collective action 
(coordination of supply, gaining certifications for exports, adopting best practices). We 
discuss intermediaries with three types of ownership (governance) patterns: private 
organisations, producer associations and an organisation with a public-private governance. In 
light of this context our enquiry is guided by the following questions. 
 
 What roles do specific intermediaries play in the upgrading activities of local 
producers and how does the internal governance of the intermediary (public, private, 
or PPG) influence the actions and impact of the intermediary in the cluster?   
 How does the position of the intermediaries in the cluster vis-á-vis other organisations, 
influence its impact in the cluster?  
 How does organizational set-up, internal governance and normative orientation of the 







Debating Intermediaries and Governance   
The question of how public services should be delivered to communities and by whom has 
been widely debated, but there appears to be little consensus on which sort of organisations 
might be more preferable for different tasks (Markelova et al 2009; Batley and McLoughlin, 
2015). Poulton et al (2010) point out that during the 1980s and 1990s the private sector was 
preferred as the primary provider of business services as it was deemed to be more efficient. 
However, whilst this tended to improve outputs to markets in high productivity areas, as 
intervention of state bodies was rolled back, it weakened market access in more remote areas. 
The argument is now more commonly made that intermediary organisations based on public-
private principles have advantages for the delivery of public goods and services. Within a 
development context, an example of this argument is illustrated by McDermott et al’s (2009) 
study of two clusters in the wine industry in Argentina, where great stress as an explanation 
for the success of sectorial transformations has been placed upon the intervention by 
government support institutions (GSIs) or as Sabel (1994) called “Developmental 
Associations”. These, it is argued, are able to understand and work with commercial realities, 
which encourages them to establish lines of communication and cross cutting ties between 
different social and geographical producer communities. The mandated requirement of these 
intermediaries to have “participatory governance”, whereby resources and membership of 
boards is made up of representatives of the state, the regulator, the private sector, 
phytiosanitary organisations and producer associations on the governing and advisory boards 
ensures that the process of upgrading is inclusive of smaller producers. The contrast is drawn 
with sectors that rely exclusively on producer associations which, whilst also playing 
important intermediary roles of coordination, prioritize their members (Gouët and Van 
Paassen, 2012; Watkins et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2014). This leads them to be more likely to 
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preside over insular and vertical networks that benefit their members rather than all the actors 
within a cluster. McDermott et al (2009) also provide a scenario where producer associations 
can provide collective information, but will more likely represent narrow and insular 
networks because their governance is control of information. Hence re-ordering will keep the 
basic network closed. These arguments are used to provide support for the benefits of 
enhancing governance forms that are broader and more inclusive such as empowered 
inclusion, multiparty governance and mutual monitoring (Sabel 1994; Schneider 2004). 
Further examples include McEvily and Zaheer (1999) and Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) 
who describe the establishment of public research institutes and training centres that help 
firms access new knowledge because of their mandates to provide collective resources and 
collaborate with firms from distinct localities.  
Markelova et al. (2009) on the other hand see a positive role for intermediation to 
facilitate collective action by providing information, technical assistance and building 
capacity, but recognise that there is little consensus about who should undertake this role. 
Commercial agents may have conflicts of interest over the distribution of surplus (Ribot 
1998), whilst non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be good facilitators for collective 
actions, but less appropriate for good performance and be tempted to intervene too actively 
(Berdege 2001). Therefore no particular organisation has a predetermined advantage.  
On this basis, the significance of intermediaries lies not just in making connections, as 
emphasized for example by Sapsed et al (2007), but by undertaking a range of activities, 
including brokering i.e. connecting dissimilar groups (Belso-Martínez et al 2015). We may 
go further by adding that by doing so, there exists the potential for transformational change as 
relationships between groups are re-ordered. Hence, collective action can no longer be 
viewed as centrally directed and instead is regarded as relational, fluid and contingent (Moss, 
2009). Therefore, intermediation not only is able to create new sets of institutions with a 
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variety of stakeholder groups, but can also provide a window for shifting governance 
relationships between relevant actors, for example by influencing the pursuit of collective 
goals (Goldberger, 2008; Yang et al., 2014, Moss 2009).  
 
 
Beyond the governance of the ego  
An important assumption upon which the above arguments rest is the prominence given to 
the agency power of intermediaries. This is not unreasonable in many developing economy 
cluster contexts where skills generally are low and there is a dearth of specialised services 
(Clarke and Ramirez, 2014). In these contexts reliance on PPG organisations is attractive to 
policy makers because it gives local leverage to particular interventions.  
The structural features of this agency power emanates partly from its deliberate role 
as a “strategic intermediary” to establish links with new types of actors and bring their 
associated knowledge into the cluster and to mediate between different interests (Medd and 
Marvin, 2004). The emphasis on deliberation is therefore of particular relevance for 
addressing the governance dimensions of intermediation because it also signifies the 
legitimacy to introduce new agendas and methodologies. And yet, the above account would 
be less able to explain the resilience of closed clusters despite the existence of PPG 
organisations, or indeed how intermediaries with very different governance rules open up 
clusters and lead successful upgrading. We outline below three factors that suggest an 
understanding of intermediary influences may go beyond the agency of the “ego”.  
Firstly, the relational structure of the cluster that arises from its history, values and 
culture is likely to play an important role and influence the development of cooperative 
relations and public infrastructure. Tsai (2007) for example, in contrast to McDermott, points 
beyond the formal institutions of accountability, to the level of civic participation in groups 
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that need to be both all encompassing (open to all) and embedding (incorporate local 
officials). These groups ensure that local officials share moral obligations and interests of the 
local community.  The above discussion recalls past debates over the primacy of agency over 
structure. Here we signal only that there is a dynamic in which the intermediary as an agent 
can influence the structure, but that the agent can in turn be influenced by the normative 
structure, and indeed changes are likely to be filtered through this normative structure.   
Secondly, we point to a range of studies which suggest that in different localities there 
often exist a diversity of intermediaries that can typically be stimulated to enhance 
interactions and opportunities for innovation (Intarakumnerd and Chaoroenporn, 2013; Kilelu 
et al., 2013; Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008). Thus, the space for intermediation can be occupied 
by organisations with different governance principles. Some intermediaries are government 
induced to stimulate economic development and innovation (Bell Jr and Juma, 2007; 
Kivimaa, 2014; Negoita and Block, 2012). For example, Perez-Aleman  (2000) traces how 
the state in Chile promoted greater openness of the business associations in the footwear and 
agri-business sectors and encouraged large “mother firms'' to assume the responsibility of 
upgrading small suppliers that enhanced the collective capacity. Rantisi’s (2014) study of the 
Montreal fur and garment industry also highlighted the role of trade associations in creating 
“local pipelines” to reduce the cognitive distance between two geographically related but 
fragmented sectors in the context where the cluster lacked lead firms. Other studies have 
shown some intermediary organizations are private but based on collective governance such 
as commodity boards and producer and industry organizations (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008a; 
Ton et al., 2007; Watkins et al., 2015), whilst others are private or NGOs (Goldberger, 2008; 
Klerkx et al., 2015). Therefore intermediaries need to be seen in the context of both the 
nature of the organisation, the community and its traditions, eschewing single explanations. 
Therefore practices are likely to evolve from complex synergies (Rhodes 1997) between 
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actors that vie for similar spaces, which may explain how lock-in to pre-existing institutional 
structures can exist.  
 Intermediaries may also vary in terms of the degree of embeddedness (Granovetter 
and Swedberg 2001) they have in the cluster. For Granovetter embeddedness referred to a 
detailed understanding of the mechanisms and processes of the social construction of 
institutions and local business networks. This ties in closely with our view of governance that 
goes beyond formal networked action, but of how organisations coordinate production 




Our principle research question is the following. How does the governance of intermediary 
organisations influence their role in the upgrading activities and adoption of new technologies 
of local producers? The empirical study is based on an analysis of two agricultural clusters 
made up of medium and small-sized agricultural producers. These also contain intermediaries 
with different governance structures and are the focus of the study.  
We analyse this question in two stages. In a first stage, social network analysis (SNA), 
is used to provide a structural analysis of the position of actors in the cluster and their 
relationships (Wassermann, & Faust, 1994). This allows us to observe which intermediaries 
are more central or marginal and infer through the links they establish the influence they may 
have on other actors. It also provides information on the influence and position of other 
organisations in the cluster (further details of SNA analysis below).  
The information for the SNA was gathered through two identical surveys, one for 
producers (17 in the palm oil, 26 in the mango cluster), and one for service organisations (9 
in the mango cluster, 5 in the palm oil). Analysis of survey data was undertaken through 
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social network analysis (SNA) techniques that permit visualization and measurement of the 
structures of relationships and the strategic of positioning of actors in these relationships. The 
survey data was gathered in both clusters through identical face-to-face surveys. The question 
asked to firms was: “from whom did your organisation (or business) receive technical 
assistance and how important was this to your organisation”? Respondents were provided a 
list of organisations (producers, services, universities, consultancies) and an open section to 
name other organisations from whom assistance had been received and to then identify and 
rank organisations from whom assistance was received from 1-5 in ascending order of 
importance. From this information it was possible to produce a network map using open 
source software, Pajek, for social network analysis. 
The second stage of the analysis involved interviews with key organisations in the 
cluster to understand how governance influences the practices of intermediation. These 
interviews build on the inferences provided by the social network analysis carried out earlier, 
but allow us to address questions such as the governing style used by different intermediaries 
and how the normative orientation of the cluster influences the intermediaries in the cluster. 
The interviews in the palm oil cluster involved two ground visits in Colombia and eight semi-
structured interviews. Because of the reduced numbers of actors present in the Palm Oil 
cluster from which SNA information was gathered, these interviews included representatives 
of large refinery firms and small producers of two Palm Oil clusters adjoining the cluster that 
is the focus of the study.  Although SNA was not conducted in these, the interview suggested 
a similar network structure i.e. a dominant refinery firm surrounded by a number of small 
level producer suppliers.  Interviews were also conducted with high level officials of 
CENIPALMA and FEDEPALMA, the Colombian Palm oil’s official producer association 
(the former being the technology arm of the latter) and two interviews with CENIPALMA 
employees working in the field, one of whom was also shadowed over two days in the same 
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palm oil cluster that was surveyed. Two interviews were also held with small farmer 
representatives and two interviews were also held with executives of large palm oil 
companies. In the case of the mango cluster, twenty semi-structured interviews took place 
with owners of small and medium-sized mango firms and directors of the main intermediaries 
including APEM, PROMANGO, the producer associations and with PROMPERU, a public- 
private intermediary agency that helps producers of mango.  The producer association 




Case Studies  
An important challenge for emerging clusters in less economically developed countries is 
meeting international certification standards required to penetrate new international markets 
and establishing early warning signals on worldwide technological and commercial 
developments (Bessant et al, 2003). In Latin America this challenge is compounded by the 
high proportion of small producers that dominate some export-oriented products. This poses 
problems in diffusing knowledge and difficulties with poor infra-structure (McCormick, 
1999).  
The two clusters we study reflect this reality. They are the palm oil cluster in the 
municipality of Puerto Wilches in north east Colombia and the mango cluster in the Piura 
area of Northern Peru. These clusters share a number of features, but also show important 
structural differences. A number of different organisations undertake intermediary roles and 
include public organisations, private organisations and producer associations. We refer to 
these clusters as “emerging clusters” because there exist opportunities for penetrating export 
markets and adopting new productive capabilities through ‘learning-by-exporting’ (Gereffi, 
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1994), but this combines with the numerical dominance of small firms and micro enterprises 
that have few resources to invest in upgrading. The global value chain literature places much 
emphasis on the powerful role that buyers higher up the value chain have traditionally played 
in passing information to suppliers to assist in upgrading production capabilities (Gereffi, 
1994; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2001). However, in this case, the task of upgrading and in 
particular incorporating new producers falls on the shoulders of local firms, local institutions 
and local intermediaries.  
 
Introduction to clusters and social network analysis  
The Peruvian Mango Cluster 
The Peruvian mango sector represents an important export sector in Peru and Piura in the 
north is the most important growing region. This cluster has a long history of providing for 
the domestic market prior to it beginning to export. As export production opened up the 
network changed significantly. Two important producer associations were formed, the 
“Associacion Peruana de Productores y Exportadores de Mango” (APEM) for medium sized 
exporters and PROMANGO for smaller-sized growers. The members of these make up 
around 30% of growers and 60% of production. The rest are micro producers. Table 2 and 
figure 2 show that there exist a number of service organisations at the local level that include 
SENASA, the phytiosanitary government body and PROMPERU, that help develop export 
links. Producers are therefore largely split between members of APEM that grow and export 
fruit and PROMANGO members that sell their produce to APEM members for export. A key 
competence is reaching certification standards necessary for exports, combating fruit plagues 
such as fruit fly, incorporating a greater control and improvement in the detail of production 
processes and technologies and establishing good networks with a range of buyers from 
different export markets. 
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Table 1 shows the outdegree centrality values of the main service providers in the 
mango cluster. Outdegree centrality represents the number of links emanating from the 
organisation in question i.e. how important is this organisations in terms of provider of 
knowledge in the cluster. As shown, SENASA, the phytosanitary organisation with 
knowledge of treating plant disease is the most important provider of knowledge. APEM and 
PROMANGO, the two industry associations, are the next most important. In addition there 
are another 13 organisations, including private consultants, producers, government 
departments, universities and certification organisations that are present in the cluster and 
provide significant services to others. PROMPERU, the main public-private intermediary 
established to promote new technology and exports plays a significant role but is behind the 
most central organisations. 
 
 
Figure 1 below provides a network map of the entire cluster. APEM and PROMANGO are 
clearly shown at the centre of this network, receiving from a wide range of organisations and 
linking together small producers. PROMPERU by comparison is in a more marginal position. 
We focus the discussion on the cases of the two dominant producer associations APEM and 
PROMANGO and PROMPERU as a PPG organisation.   






Our discussion centres on the influence and position of three organisations: APEM, 
PROMANGO and PROMPERU. PROMPERU (The Commission for the Promotion of Peru) 
was established in 1993 and although it is dependent on the Ministry of Commerce, it acts as 
a public-private organisation through its provision of both financial and organisational 
support to exporting firms. Its directorate is made up of a mix of public and private sector 
representatives. The mission of PROMPERU reflects two important principles in the 
Peruvian political discourse as put forward by a succession of Peruvian governments. The 
first is to promote export-led growth in the Peruvian economy and secondly to make this 
growth inclusive of poorer groups of society.  
PROMPERU has worked in several agricultural sectors encouraging knowledge 
acquisition and industry organisation needed for export success. In addition to accessing 
commercial intelligence it works with industry actors on market penetration strategies. It also 
Figure 1 Social Network Analysis Map of the Mango Cluster 
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has a special emphasis on supporting SMEs as this is recognised as an important sector 
within the Peruvian economy. PROMPERU’s most influential period in the mango cluster 
was at the end of the 1990s when it used its links to open up the international markets for 
mango producers. Initially it attempted to establish one local association for all mango 
producers as a single point of contact for the industry to lower costs through economies of 
scale and a route to encourage cooperation and joint learning. However, this failed and seed 
money was provided firstly for APEM and shortly afterwards PROMANGO. According to a 
PROMPERU representative the separation of these bodies was to do primarily with 
personalities. As a PROMPERU manager commented: 
 
‘if you are seeking to export then you are working with huge companies, they are 
asking for volume and they are asking for quality…if you are not well organised 
then you do not have any chance at all of entering international markets. They 
(APEM and PROMANGO) do not have a different strategy, and they do not have a 
different way of proceeding’. 
 
And yet, the differences between small growers and medium-sized exporters are actually 
significant and structural. This is based in part on tensions in market transactions 
(information asymmetry, price, timing of payment, quality). However, as will become clear, 
these reveal more fundamental differences between individual and collective approaches to 
the use technology, the transfer of knowledge and the values of solidarity and inclusion 
between the two communities of producers. These have led to the development of parallel 
business models. With few resources to buy fertilizers, small producers have been in a 
favourable position to move into the organic market which is naturally suited to them because 
it requires few substantial changes in the way the crop is produced. PROMPERU developed 
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its skills to provide technical knowledge on certifications, and extended this to two 
associations of micro producers, Apromalpi in the Chulacanes region of Piura and Agrovida 
that have been able obtain organic certification. 
The experience of PROMPERU highlights the importance that a PPG intermediary 
can have by supporting collective action among different groups of producers, including 
those reliant on small-scale production. Its governance is defined by its mission to open up 
the cluster to new markets, combining business acumen with commitment to support niches 
as well as commodity production and markets. PROMPERU therefore created the formal 
network that has transformed this region into an export hub. Nevertheless, the architecture of 
this network has reproduced rather than replaced the historical structural cleavage between 
medium-sized and small producers. Once the export supply chains became established, 
PROMPERU’s role became more peripheral and APEM assumed the main exporting role.  
A defining feature of APEM (Peruvian Association of Mango Exporters) is its strong 
commercial and business focus, which is a reflection of the pioneering export firms that first 
set it up. Its core competency is helping firms serve international export markets, primarily 
the USA and Europe. In its early days it worked on improving the infrastructure, including 
the port of Paita which serves the Piuran cluster. Since the mid-2000s, APEM has, with 
support from PROMPERU, developed markets in East Asia including Japan, China and, 
since 2014, South Korea. This has involved moving into better packaging and more general 
product aesthetics through the selection of the Kent mango variety for export to South Korea 
(Fresh Fruit Portal, 2014). A major step forward has been the establishment of a Standards 
Committee in the early 2000s, made up of exporters, producer representatives and a local 
university researcher, that meet regularly and evaluate international quality norms for mangos. 
It produces a 'technical norms' document for producers, providing guidance on sweetness 
level, fibrosity and colour in addition to specifying maximum limits for pesticide 
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contamination. APEM has been particularly effective at preventing the flooding of the US 
market and subsequent fall in prices by coordinating with other mango exporters in South 
America to monitor volumes being released for export. The market intelligence it obtains is 
closely guarded and treated as a collective “club” good, accessible only to APEM members. 
As a representative for medium-sized larger exporters, its governance reflects its 
members commercial interests. There has been some fundraising to facilitate certification of 
small producers (that sell to APEM members), but engagement with PROMANGO for 
example is minimal and quality development centres on consolidation and vertical integration, 
rather than through an inclusive-based network. Indeed, a number of APEM firms have 
acquired land from small producers.  
Like APEM, PROMANGO is a producer association that was formed in 2002 with 
seed money from PROMPERU. Unlike APEM, it represents smaller producers that have little 
direct access to international markets. PROMANGO members have had difficult 
relationships with large exporting firms over a number of years and this was crucial in 
shaping how PROMANGO was constituted. Its members are primarily concerned with the 
challenges of producing (rather that selling) for the export market under difficult soil 
conditions and an erratic local climate. Much knowledge is tacit. The annual congress of 
PROMANGO is dominated by discussion of treatment of diseases, management of fruit and 
diversification into other products. These practices have spawned a strong sense of 
community and as a result, the actions of PROMANGO are primarily based on strengthening 
the network of producers and enhancing collective actions. For example, the first hot water 
treatment machine was purchased between all members and its use is shared by all members 
of the association. PROMANGO therefore has played a critical role as a bridge builder for 




'the situation before was that all of the producers felt that they had the secret for 
producing good mangos, and they didn’t wish to share it with anyone…. Through 
forming PROMANGO, we started to share all types of information, group together 
what each firm was doing, and in this way we created a network between the 
organizations members’.  
 
Decision-making processes tend to be open and members are kept together by bounds of 
solidarity has facilitated the sharing of some public goods. In this  shared technology is not 
just about production, but of inclusion, since producers can have different abilities to upgrade. 
This contrasts sharply with APEM members that work together for the express purpose of 
expanding markets and strengthening individual practices.  
With limited resources, PROMANGO has enabled all of its members to obtain 
EUREPGAP certification, which is significant since the European market is expanding and 
pays a higher price than the US market. As its producers have developed, PROMANGO has 
also worked on better coordination of the components of the mango production chain. 
Previously members’ production had concentrated around the month of January, leading to 
over-production, which affected the revenue it earned. Experts from Israel and Brazil were 
invited and visited the farms of members, providing advice, which helped members to 
lengthen the production period from November to March. 
The discussion of the mango cluster has highlighted cluster evolution as the outcome 
of new opportunities, ongoing tensions between groups and negotiations between 
intermediary organisations. Rather than imposing a set of top-down solutions as might have 
been the case in the past, the state has intervened to “steer” a set of cluster actors towards the 
international market. The networks that have been formed mirror structures of power and is 
reflected in the creation of two networks around APEM and PROMANGO. APEM’s business 
19 
 
orientation is outward looking and emphasizes cross-cluster cooperation but does not 
represent the cluster as whole. Indeed it could be argued that the asymmetry of information 
between large and small-sized producers has been magnified as small producers remain 
vulnerable to climate and price fluctuations in a way that large and medium firms have been 
able to insulate themselves against. Hence, the historical fragmentation has become more 
entrenched through the development of APEM. 
The influence of PROMPERU has been constrained by resource limitations, 
geographical distance and the difficulties of working in a cluster with a complex power 
structure. Nevertheless, it has used its position to make the small producer networks visible 
and to carve out an independent route for access to international markets
1
. Without 
PROMPERU’S aid, small producers may well have remained on the margins of the network.   
 
The Colombia Palm Oil Cluster 
Colombia is the world’s 4th largest producer of palm oil. However, unlike production in 
Malaysia and Indonesia that is dominated by large firms, it is small producers have in the last 
decade begun to play a significant role in production. In 2012 18.7% of the palm oil land was 
cultivated by small producers (through the so-called “alliances”), up from 3.7% in 1999 
(Córdoba 2011). This has important implications for the large refinery firms that produce as 
well refine palm oil, for whilst ten years ago the refinery firms bought just 30% of the fruit 
from outside (the rest they grew themselves), today that figure has risen to 70% (Córdoba 
2011). The mutual dependence (and tensions) between small producers and refinery 
organisations is therefore critical to understand the palm oil industry in Colombia.  
                                               
1
 Its agency arses partly from its legitimacy as a neutral actor in the local power structure 
and agent of the ministry of commerce (and seed money resources) and secondly its 
competence in establishing links with outside organisations such as exporters and marketing 




At the time of the interviews, knowledge transfer around new technologies and new 
organisational practices has been dominated by the spread of the Pudricion del Cogollo (PC), 
(translated but root disease), an airborne disease affecting tropical climate areas that has 
wiped out large numbers of palm trees. Large resources, including R&D spending by 
CENIPALMA, have been devoted to developing alternative disease resistant trees and 
prevention measures to stop the spread of the PC.   
Critical to the adoption of this protocol is the “UATTAS”, the national institutional 
architecture drawn up by CENIPALMA for technology transfer. This involves creating an 
alliance between small producers and a neighbouring refinery firm for preventative treatment 
of trees and vigilance. Each UATTA is supported by one agronomer per 3000-5000 ha and 
one technical assistant per 1000-1500 ha and involves provision of technical services, 
including adoption of ISO 9000 certification. The refinery firm acts as the intermediary for 
the small producer, transferring practices from CENIPALMA. Technology transfer therefore 
is designed in a top-down manner. The network architecture of the palm oil cluster in figure 2 
shows this clearly. There is a refinery organisation that we call E1 in the middle of a network 
of small producers. CENIPALMA, the industry association, brings knowledge in from 
outside the cluster and provides knowledge to E1 and has a direct link to some of the small 
producers.     
In contrast to the mango case study, the palm oil cluster shown in table 2 and figure 2 
below therefore shows a fairly simple hub and spoke structure with information largely 
centralised around two nodes. The small producers are almost totally dependent on E1 for 
access to new knowledge. Moreover, there are very few bilateral links between the 









We focus the discussion on the role of the industry association CENIPALMA and the 
refinery firm E1 as intermediaries in the knowledge transfer process with small producers. As 
indicated earlier, the programme of technology transfer has been designed by CENIPALMA. 
Its national coverage allows it to transcend narrow local interests and it has advanced 
international cooperation agreements with palm oil related centres of excellence around the 
world. The 2015 international palm oil congress held in Cartagena in Colombia brought 
Table 2: Centrality of Knowledge Providers in the Palm Oil Clusters 
Figure 2: Social Network Analysis Map of the Palm Oil Cluster 
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together 1700 practitioners, 100 company representatives and expert speakers from 30 
countries. 90% of the speakers were from overseas. CENIPLAMA has a specialised R&D 
laboratory in Barrancabermeja staffed with postgraduates technicians and is recognised as 
one of the top science centres in the country. It also has agricultural extension staff with 
specialised knowledge in Palm oil and the technicians are therefore strongly embedded in the 
sector. There is little representation of small producers in CENIPALMA or FEDEPLAMA, 
its sister organisation, as most of the subscriptions are made by large refinery firms. 
The UATTA framework for technology transfer reflects an effort to rationalise the 
fragmented nature of production in Colombia with many small-sized producers. This means 
there is high reliance not only on agricultural extension workers in the different areas of the 
country, but also on technical specialists employed by the refinery firms. This is posed as a 
win-win situation for large and small producers. Refinery firms receive a steady supply of 
raw material from small producers, who in turn receive technical assistance to improve 
productivity and prevent disease. CENIPALMA states that there are currently 100 “strategic 
alliances”, in so-called “inclusive business” partnerships (Córdoba 2011). However, a major 
problem is that “the technical teams in the plantations do not work as a strategic unit, but 
rather as individuals” Córdoba (2011). This reflects the difficulties of establishing uniform 
norms in highly contrasting climate and soil conditions, but also the diverse local relations 
between small producers and refinery firms.  
If we take the case E1, this where a privately owned organisation is drawn in to acting 
as an intermediary. Its role needs to be considered in the light of the changing relationship 
between large landowners involved in agroindustry (some of whom have historically been 
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In our interviews we were able to discern contrasting attitudes by the large refineries 
towards their intermediary functions. Figure 2 demonstrates the case where the large refinery 
firm has stepped in to assist small farmers in the adoption of new techniques and other 
assistance such as the provision of bridging loans and donations to local community schools. 
It is this model that CENIPALMA has hoped to institutionalize across the industry based on 
the close physical proximity between refinery firms and small firms. However, as intimated, a 
feature of the industry is the variation in relationships between firms in cluster. As a 
CENIPALMA official commented: 
 
“There are some nucleos where the leading company is only really interested in 
buying the fruit, it is not interested under which conditions this is produced, but there 
are cases of projects such as Indupalma, where there is a contract between the 
anchor firm and where the whole sanitary scheme is run by the anchor firm, the ally 
is just waiting to pay off the credit and they then take charge of their plantation. So in 
some places it is working in others it hardly exists…this is very new and requires a 
change in the scheme of things”. 
 
Where the UATTAS function, the motivations for the refinery firm to support small 
producers therefore reflects a combination of paternalism – a desire to help the conditions of 
small farmers– and a more pragmatic awareness of the need to invest in the surrounding 
                                               
2 Land ownership in rural areas and agriculture in general in Colombia have historically been a source of tension 
between those involved in agroindustry, where agricultural production is primarily a business and a section of 
whom at times have used fraudulent or violent means to expand control of the land, and smaller producers who 
consider work on the land a means of making a basic living. This was especially the case in the period 1990 and 
2010 where in some areas a reconfiguration of land ownership took place as a consequence of expropriation of 
land for palm oil use (Vidal, 2011) 
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farms to stabilize supply and halt the spread of the PC disease. Occasionally this bypasses or 
layers on top of the UATTA through peer to peer producer to producer relationships between 
a large refinery firm and local producers. 
 However, it is also common for refinery firms to show reluctance to involve 
themselves in national institutional agreements to provide collective services. This view was 
underlined by an executive of a neighbouring refinery firm that, when asked to intermediate 
for small producers commented: 
 
We don’t feel responsible for their survival, and small producers don’t see us as 
having the authority to make them”. 
 
According to the respondent, apart from buying the fruit, the refinery firm’s relationship with 
its small cluster of neighbours was at the most lending money for fertilizer or other costs.   
 
The governance style of each organisation clearly comes through in the palm oil cluster 
study. CENIPALMA is an industry intermediary set up with a deliberative function to 
provide collective service goods to its members. Its governance style is dictated through the 
medium of technical and scientific expertise which is used to assert its authority. For 
example, when asked about how the specific anti-PC practices it developed was justified to 
users, a CENIPLAMA official was clear: 
 
In sanitary terms, it has to be done via the scheme we developed that unifies criterion. 
Everybody has to speak the same language. So if there is a user and he says “I have 
this experience of working on this disease”….no sir, we are not going to do that, we 
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CENIPLAMA’s framework for intermediation is therefore driven by a technology-push logic 
and the UATTA is built on increasing productivity that permeates across geographical and 
contextual boundaries. This rationalises practices across the industry and, although it does not 
have the authority of a government ministry, within the industry its style at times resembles 
that of a hierarchy.  
The intermediary actions of the refineries reflect a combination of pressures and 
expectations. Some clearly recoil at being cast in the role of intermediaries (perhaps 
following past experiences of less than loyal small producer allies
3
 and because it gets in the 
way of their refinery activities). Other refineries will undertake the provision of collective 
services in a paternalist fashion to create reciprocal local ties. This reflects its governance, but 
also the expectations of the rest of the industry that it needs to help contain the spread of the 
PC disease.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our initial analysis of network structure underlines the central position that intermediaries 
hold for the development of agricultural clusters. The interviews also highlighted their pivotal 
roles in the provision of collective goods, the opening up clusters to outside expertise and as 
facilitators of change and innovation.  
                                               
3 It is fairly common for small producers to renounce local agreements to sell to the nearest refinery and instead 
accept a slightly higher price from a different refinery.  
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Producer associations were the most visible intermediaries in both cases studies. In 
some quarters producer associations have been critiqued for being inward looking 
(McDermott et al, 2009), however our discussions of APEM and PROMANGO in the mango 
cluster and CENIPALMA in the palm oil cluster, highlighted bonding activities to 
consolidate networks and important brokerage roles to open up clusters to outside knowledge, 
which corresponds with findings elsewhere highlighting these roles (Devaux et al., 2009; 
Yang, 2013). Their source of legitimacy derives partly from their role as the principle agent 
of the communities of producers, but also from the high level of embeddedness and local 
knowledge of the cluster. However, this case also demonstrates there is not a linear or fixed 
causal relationship between organisational governance and its influence on the surrounding 
cluster.  
The case of PROMPERU is significant because of its role as an organisation 
established by the Peruvian state to stimulate innovation and inclusion in the mango sector. 
Its legitimacy derives from its contacts and direct link to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Nevertheless it has not had the same of degree of embeddedness in the mango cluster as the 
producer associations. Consequently knowledge asymmetries between larger and smaller 
producers have been reproduced (and indeed reinforced) by the producer associations, with 
the reluctant acceptance of PROMPERU. E1 contrasts with the above cases. It questions its 
legitimacy to be an intermediary, although in practice small producers are more dependent on 
it than in our other examples. The paternal style it uses reflects previous relationships that 
have been based on reciprocal favours.  
We conclude the discussion with three points. The first is that intermediaries work 
across the often impermeable boundaries between different actor groups, arenas of action, 
and geographical scales. In doing so they open up clusters to opportunities for radical 
changes in production strategies. However, contrary to what we might have expected, the 
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basic social architecture of the network - the division between medium and small-sized 
producers - is retained, indeed reinforced. This is related to our second point that, as Medd 
and Marvin (2008) commented, far from limiting themselves to being arbiters and neutral, 
intermediaries can play an important role in break down insularity and re-ordering and 
defining relationships. Nevertheless, the lack of local embeddedness means PPG 
intermediaries that have been established outside the cluster can also have limited reach. 
Finally, organisational governance exerts a marked influence on how the agency of 
intermediaries is exercised. However, intermediary organisations are also influenced by both 
the normativity of relations in the clusters and the map of different organisations working in 
overlapping spaces. In this sense the evolution of the cluster emerges from the negotiation 
between these different organisations, resembling earlier findings by Kilelu et al. (2013). This 
task is particularly challenging given that governing in networks requires diplomacy rather 
than command (Rhodes, 1997). We are therefore at one with Moss (2009), when he reflects 
that the full value of the governance approach perhaps lies in its recognition of the 
complexity of institutional structures, social relations and decision-making processes rather 
than the provision of explanations that rely on the power of single organisations.  
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